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Figure 1 
Non-performing loans in EU-10 countries, 
2007-2009 YTD, in percent of bank loans
Source:  Global Financial Stability Report, International Monetary 
Fund, October 2009, and national central banks.
More than a year after the col-lapse of Lehman Brothers, the 
vulnerabilities of the banking sector in the 
EU-10 seem to have subsided. Earlier con-
cerns about the strength of the commitment 
of parent banks in the region to their local 
subsidiaries have diminished. As a result, 
the risk of a sudden withdrawal of foreign 
financing is now lower. Concerns about li-
quidity and solvency of the sector have also 
lessened, largely owing to forceful interven-
tions by central banks, governments and in-
ternational institutions. 
However, the banking sector is not out 
of the woods yet. In particular, there still 
a concern about the impact of increases in 
banking credit losses on the stability of the 
banking sector. Bank losses are increasing 
as corporations and households are facing 
difficulties in servicing their debts. Banks 
are seeing their loan portfolio deteriorate as 
firms are hit by the collapse of demand and 
higher costs of financing, while households 
are affected by rising unemployment and 
increased debt burden following currency 
depreciation pressures. In Latvia, the hard-
est hit country among the new EU member 
states, non-performing loans (NPLs) have 
increased from 3.6 percent at end-2008 to 
15 percent in October 2009 (Figure 1).  On 
a broader definition that includes substand-
ard, doubtful and lost loans, NPLs in Latvia 
as of end-October exceeded 25 percent (and 
15 percent in Romania), not far from earli-
er banking crises in Asia, Russia, and Latin 
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America where NPLs exceeded 30 percent 
(Table 1). Given that the economic recovery 
in the region is likely to remain tepid, NPLs 
are set to rise further. This is no doubt the 
key challenge entering a new decade.
Rising bank losses may undermine the 
impending economic recovery, as banks re-
duce lending to companies and households 
to secure their capital base, improve liquid-
ity, and reduce new risks. Banks in the re-
gion have already substantially tightened 
lending criteria, increased credit margins, 
and reduced access to credit, particularly 
for small and medium enterprises. Even in 
Poland, the country in the region that was 
least affected by the global financial crisis, 
banks continued to tighten credit lending 
criteria for enterprises throughout 2009, 
although fewer banks than before expect 
to further tighten credit policy in the near 
future6). The uncertainty about future de-
velopments in the corporate and house-
hold market, especially as regards the im-
pact of rising unemployment, additionally 
constrains bank funding available in the 
economy.
Estimating banking sector’s  
credit losses
While the full impact of the crisis 
on asset quality in the region is still un-
known, past banking and currency crises 
offer a rough guide to assess underlying 
risks. What follows in this section should 
be viewed as an illustration of the possible 
risks if economic conditions were to dete-
riorate, for instance in the event of a double 
dip in the global economy, including risks 
arising from a currency crisis that would 
exacerbate further the stresses in banks’ 
balance sheets. 
Specifically, the focus is on banking 
crises where declines in GDP in the year 
following the onset of the crisis exceeded 
5 percent and that were accompanied by 
a currency crisis. In such cases, the NPLs 
on average rise to 30 percent (Table 1), 
Table 1 
List of Banking and Currency Crisis Countries
Country
Crisis year
NPLs  
(% of all loans)
Banking and Currency Crisis
Argentina 1980 9.0
Argentina 1989 27.0
Argentina 2001 20.1
Brazil 1994 16.0
Bulgaria 1996 75.0
Chile 1981 35.6
Dominican Republic 2003 9.0
Ecuador 1998 40.0
Estonia 1991 7.0
Indonesia 1997 32.5
Jamaica 1996 28.9
Korea 1997 35.0
Malaysia 1997 30.0
Mexico 1994 18.9
Philippines 1997 20.0
Russia 1998 40.0
Sweden 1991 13.0
Turkey 2000 27.6
Ukraine 1998 62.4
Uruguay 2002 36.3
Venezuela 1994 24.0
Average 28.9
Median 27.6
Country Banking Crisis Only
Argentina 1995 17.0
Bolivia 1994 6.2
Colombia 1982 4.1
Colombia 1998 14.0
Croatia 1998 10.5
Czech Republic 1996 18.0
Finland 1991 13.0
Japan 1997 35.0
Latvia 1995 20.0
Lithuania 1995 32.2
Nicaragua 2000 12.7
Norway 1991 16.4
Paraguay 1995 8.1
Sri Lanka 1989 35.0
Thailand 1997 33.0
Vietnam 1997 35.0
Average 19.4
Median 16.7
Source:  Based on Laeven L., Valencia F., Systemic Banking 
Crises: A New Database, International Monetary 
Fund, Working Paper WP/08/224, 2008.
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which in turn may be viewed as a proxy for 
the probability of default. In addition, re-
covery rates may be assumed to be rough-
ly 40 percent on mortgages, in line with 
the marked declines that have occurred in 
housing prices, and 15 percent on loans to 
firms, which broadly matches the average 
assumption made by the Swedish Riksbank 
on the exposure of Swedish banks to the 
Baltic States2). The shares of households and 
firms in the total loan portfolio – a meas-
ure of exposure – are provided by broad 
characterization of the consolidated bank-
ing sectors in EU-10 countries. A preferable 
approach no doubt would be to calibrate 
the recovery rate by sector and country de-
pending on country-specific bankruptcy 
resolution frameworks and other institu-
tional characteristics that impact recovery 
rates, but such data are only available to 
banking supervision authorities of each in-
dividual country and collected with diverse 
methodologies.
The result of the analysis suggests that 
the credit losses in the EU-10 countries may 
be substantial but overall remain manage-
able. In a scenario based on the experience 
around the world with past episodes of 
joint banking and currency crises (as de-
fined earlier, that is where GDP declines by 
more than 5 percent), the estimated losses 
vary from 9 percent of GDP in Romania to 
Table 2 
Credit Losses – Extrapolating from Past Crisis Events
Share of lending to Outstanding private credit Alternative 
assumptions
Losses (w/ NPLs)
HH Firms in bill. LCU in % GDP in bill. LCU in % GDP
Belarus2) 0.25 0.75 37159 29 NPLs 3) 8632 7
Bulgaria 0.35 0.65 50 74 29.50 11 17
Croatia 0.50 0.50 222 65 48 14
Czech Republic 0.40 0.60 1947 53 LRGD-HH 4) 431 12
Estonia1) 0.50 0.50 245 99 0.40 52 21
FYR Macedonia 0.40 0.60 175 44 39 10
Hungary 0.40 0.60 18527 69 LRGD-Firms 5) 4099 15
Kazakhstan2) 0.25 0.75 7972 50 0.15 1852 12
Latvia1) 0.50 0.50 15 90 3 19
Lithuania1) 0.45 0.55 70 63 15 14
Montenegro 0.40 0.60 3 81 1 18
Poland 0.40 0.60 633 50 140 11
Romania 0.40 0.60 194 38 43 9
Russia2) 0.30 0.70 17102 41 3910 9
Serbia 0.40 0.60 1072 38 237 8
Turkey2) 0.30 0.70 310 33 71 7
Ukraine2) 0.30 0.70 700 74 160 17
Average 58 13
Median 53 12
1) Assumes somewhat higher role of mortgage lending given developments in housing prices.
2) Assumes a lower share of HH lending; loans corporates still dominate.
3) NPLs are assumed to match the levels observed in the Laeven and Valencia database for cases with a currency crisis; 
in effect this is broadly equivalent to cases where the decline in GDP in period t+1 is at least 5 percent.
4) Assumes loan-to-value ratios of one and a loan recovery rate of only 40 percent given the decline in housing prices.
5) The loss recovery given default (LRGD) is set at the average level observed during the Asian crisis.
Source:  Mitra P., Selowsky M., Zalduendo J., Turmoil at Twenty: Recession, Recovery, and Reform in Central and 
Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, The World Bank Press, Washington DC 2009.
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21 percent of GDP in Estonia, with an aver-
age of some 13 percent of GDP for emerg-
ing Europe as a whole, comprising EU-10 
and other countries in the region (Table 2). 
The variation across countries is largely ac-
counted for by the size of the loan portfolio; 
in other words, the share of credit in GDP. 
Of course the scenario could be more op-
timistic about recovery rates. For example, 
housing prices in many countries in the re-
gion have not declined as much and banks 
might choose not to proceed immediately to 
sell these assets to avoid worsening housing 
market conditions. In fact, in a scenario in 
which recovery rates in mortgages average 
75 percent, credit losses would range any-
where from 6 to 16 percentage points of GDP 
– and of course this still assumes worsening 
economic conditions that today seem more 
likely to be avoided. 
Importantly, NPLs in the EU-10 at this 
stage of the crisis are much lower than was 
the case during earlier banking crises, whe-
re NPLs peaked quite rapidly at 32 percent 
in Indonesia, 35 percent in Korea, 30 per-
cent in Malaysia during the East Asian cri-
sis, and at 40 percent in Russia and 36 per-
cent in Uruguay during their crises in the 
late 1990’s and early 2000’s (Figure 2). The 
increases observed in past capital account 
crises reflect a combination of both incre-
ased and widespread corporate distress. 
One possible factor behind this difference 
is that currency crises have been avoided 
in the EU-10, perhaps because of the abun-
dant provision of official financial and the 
opportune international coordination effort 
put forward by the EC and international fi-
nancial institutions.
Factors mitigating banking  
credit losses
Banking sector credit losses in the CEE 
region may be mitigated by a number of 
factors. First, companies in EU-10 have rela-
tively low corporate leverage. Debt leverage 
of non-financial companies, as measured by 
the ratio of total debt to total assets, is lower 
in EU-10 countries than in emerging mar-
kets three years prior to, during, and three 
years following the year in which they ex-
perienced a crisis5). The leverage is also low-
er than in the four EU cohesion countries 
Figure 2 
Non-performing loans in the EU-10 in 2009 and Historical Data for Banking 
and Currency Crisis Countries (in percent of bank loans)
Note: Crisis average taken from Table 1.
Source:  EU-10 Regular Economic Report: From Stabilization to Recovery, The World Bank 
Group, October 2009, based on IMF (2009), and national central banks for the EU-10.
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– Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal – that 
have been hard hit by the current financial 
crisis (Table 3). Overall leverage in Poland 
and Czech Republic remained moderate 
throughout the period. Leverage was much 
higher in Hungary, but it was still about 
half of the high levels seen in East Asia dur-
ing its crisis in 1997-98 and was also gener-
ally lower than in Argentina (2001), Brazil 
(1998), Mexico (1995), and Turkey (2001) in 
the years of their crises. In addition, corpo-
rate interest rate coverage in the EU-10 re-
gion is also high, helping to reduce risks of 
losses, although not for all countries1).
Second, although household debt may 
be vulnerable to default, following rapid ex-
pansion of credit throughout the last dec-
ade (Table 4) and risks of exchange rates 
and interest rates shocks, as well as falling 
real estate prices7), household indebtedness 
is in most cases moderate. Household debt 
in the EU-10 countries represents on aver-
age over a quarter of GDP, though there is 
significant cross-country variation, with 
the figure reaching above 40 percent in 
some countries (Figure 3). These ratios are 
below the present average of about 65 per-
cent of GDP for the EU15 and closer to those 
for Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain dur-
ing the late 1990s. Moreover, the mortgage 
interest service burden among the poorest 
households, which are presumably the most 
vulnerable to a credit default, are on a mod-
erate level and range from 7 to 13 percent of 
household income. In addition, the fraction 
of households with mortgages in the poor-
est quintile is quite small7).
Third, household debt defaults may also 
be mitigated by measures adopted by gov-
ernments. Hungary has introduced legisla-
Table 3 
Non-Financial Corporate Leverage – Recent History for Selected EU-10 Countries and Crisis Years 
for Comparator Countries (median values)
Number 
of Firms1) 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Czech Republic 31 23.9 18.0 12.8 10.3 8.9 10.1 10.8 9.7 8.9 11.6
Hungary 33 11.1 17.4 11.7 12.8 17.2 17.1 15.7 21.1 13.2 27.6
Poland 167 11.7 13.0 16.5 17.7 18.3 15.9 15.6 15.9 15.5 17.1
Turkey 182 25.5 27.5 26.2 21.1 19.7 16.7 16.7 19.2 16.5 21.7
Greece 268 20.2 20.4 26.8 28.0 29.5 29.2 31.9 30.2 32.6 34.4
Ireland 68 25.5 27.4 30.6 29.3 28.7 23.5 27.0 29.3 28.4 34.7
Portugal 64 29.3 32.4 35.6 37.1 35.2 35.2 34.8 38.9 40.8 46.3
Spain 163 20.4 23.2 24.0 26.0 27.7 28.1 31.9 33.0 33.3 34.1
                                                    Period (‘t’ represent the year of the crisis) 2)
t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3
Korea (1997) 442 44.1 45.1 46.1 50.5 44.6 33.4 31.1
Thailand (1997) 273 32.6 37.7 40.9 53.1 45.1 41.1 43.4
Indonesia (1997) 171 28.6 31.6 34.7 51.8 61.3 50.3 47.1
Argentina (2001) 78 33.4 30.6 31.2 27.7 31.4 25.8 23.1
Brazil (1998) 257 18.0 24.3 26.1 27.3 26.2 26.1 31.4
Mexico (1995) 82 28.7 29.9 31.1 31.9 28.3 28.7 28.0
Turkey (2001) 158 24.1 25.5 27.5 26.2 25.1 19.7 16.7
Notes: 
1) Average over period. 
2) Crisis year is defined as “t” and is indicated in parenthesis next to the corresponding country.
Source:  EU-10 Regular Economic Report: From Stabilization to Recovery, The World Bank Group, October 2009, based 
on DataStream.
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tion to provide temporary state guarantees 
for mortgage payments of the unemployed 
and submitted legislation to Parliament to 
expand the partial mortgage debt servic-
ing guarantee scheme for the unemployed 
to other debtors, whose payment capacity 
has been temporarily impaired by the fi-
nancial crisis. Poland introduced a similar 
scheme for mortgage repayment among the 
newly unemployed. Romania has sought an 
agreement with commercial banks to facili-
tate the restructuring of debt contracted in 
foreign currency, by adjusting the maturity 
and repayment schedule of the debt, includ-
ing offering the option to voluntarily con-
vert it into domestic currency. Other coun-
tries in the region have contemplated similar 
programs. Worth noting is that many coun-
tries in the region have introduced schemes 
to facilitate out-of-court loan restructuring 
efforts, which aim at maximizing good faith 
efforts of all parties to a loan.
Table 4 
Growth of Credit to Households and Corporations, 2003-2008
Average 
Growth of 
Credit to 
Households 
2003-2008
Average 
Growth of 
Credit to 
Corporations 
2003-2008
Rations of Lending  
to Households to Lending  
to Corporates
Share of Housing Loans  
in Total Household  
Lending
2003 2008 2003 2008
Bulgaria 40.7% 57.3% 37.2% 59.0% – 42.8%
Czech Republic 26.5% 11.8% 69.1% 126.2% 65.4% 70.3%
Estonia 38.7% 32.3% 82.5% 103.3% 77.6% 80.5%
Hungary 21.3% 7.2% 52.9% 95.0% 64.3% 50.7%
Latvia 44.1% 28.0% 50.3% 87.8% 64.0% 78.9%
Lithuania 59.1% 30.6% 28.9% 75.1% 76.4% 69.3%
Poland 27.5% 13.3% 101.8% 181.8% 30.1% 52.5%
Romania – 104.9% – 21.1%
Slovak Republic 28.2% 9.8% 39.8% 84.3% 68.9% 67.7%
Russia 59.4% 26.6% 11.4% 33.2% – 27.6%
Turkey 45.4% 23.6% 36.9% 78.9% 27.2% 32.5%
Ukraine 83.8% 46.6% 33.6% 63.2% 24.9% 31.5%
Source:  IFS and Central Banks.
Figure 3 
Household Debt, 2008 (percent of GDP, end of period)
Source:  European Central Bank; 
National Central Banks; 
IMF; and UniCredit.
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Lastly, and equally importantly, banks’ 
balance sheets in the region can accommo-
date a rise in losses. Capital adequacy ra-
tios are significantly above the mandatory 
8 percent floor in all countries in the region. 
Losses on loans have been so far largely pro-
visioned in a timely fashion. Bank’s profit-
ability remained positive in most countries 
in the region during 2009, providing ad-
ditional cushion against losses (Table 5). 
Crucially, foreign parent banks have con-
tinued to support their local subsidiaries 
with injections of both capital and liquid-
ity3). And central banks, governments, and 
international institutions such as the World 
Bank, European Investment Bank and the 
EBRD have put forward financial support 
operations.
There are a number of observations en-
suing from this article. First, even if the 
macroeconomic environment were to wors-
en, credit losses in the EU-10 banking sector 
are likely to be substantial but remain man-
ageable, particularly with continued support 
from parent banks and the domestic au-
thorities. Second, expected rise in corporate 
credit losses is likely to be mitigated by a rel-
atively low corporate leverage and high in-
terest cover, although of course some coun-
tries are somewhat more vulnerable. Third, 
household debt is vulnerable to default, but 
the risk is partly offset by a still low level of 
household indebtedness, in particular when 
compared to advanced countries, and gov-
ernments’ efforts to ensure that a menu of 
options is available to address mortgage debt 
problems in a timely manner.
However, banking sectors in EU-10 will 
remain vulnerable to shifts in global market 
sentiment and potential growth reversals, 
and risks of a double dip in the global econ-
omy materializing. To minimize the risks of 
the return of market turbulence and to sup-
port the impending recovery, foreign par-
Table 5 
Banking sector’s stability and profitability indicators for the EU-10  
and selected countries, 2003-2009
Capital adequacy 1) Loan provisions 2) Return on equity
2003 2007 2008 2009 2003 2007 2008 2009 2003 2007 2008 2009
Bulgaria 22.0 13.9 14.9 16.5 50.0 – – – 22.7 24.8 23.1 15.7
Czech Republic 14.5 11.5 12.3 13.7 76.7 70.4 67.5 61.3 23.8 25.4 21.7 23.4
Estonia 12.5 10.8 13.3 15.2 214.5 – – – 14.1 30.0 13.2 8.7
Hungary 11.8 10.4 11.1 12.3 47.3 58.1 59.6 52.6 19.3 18.1 11.6 15.3
Latvia 11.7 11.1 11.8 12.8 89.4 129.8 61.3 40.7 16.7 24.3 4.6 -19.7
Lithuania 13.2 10.9 12.9 13.9 – – – – 11.4 27.3 16.1 -1.0
Poland 13.8 12.0 11.2 11.7 53.4 – – – 5.8 22.4 20.7 15.6
Romania 21.1 13.8 12.3 – 12.6 25.7 28.7 – 20.0 11.5 18.1 –
Slovak Republic 22.4 12.8 11.1 12.2 85.8 93.3 91.4 88.3 10.8 16.6 14.1 4.1
Slovenia 11.5 11.2 10.5 – 81.0 – – – 11.9 16.3 9.0 –
Russia 19.1 15.5 16.8 18.5 118.0 144.0 118.4 90.8 17.8 22.7 13.3 3.6
Turkey 30.9 19.0 18.1 19.2 88.6 88.4 81.4 79.4 16.0 21.6 16.6 25.1
Ukraine 15.2 13.9 14.0 14.5 22.3 26.3 29.6 29.8 7.6 12.7 8.5 -24.5
Austria 14.5 11.8 12.7 12.9 68.0 76.4 64.0 63.0 7.0 17.0 2.6 –
Notes: 
1) Risk weighted capital assets ratio. 
2) Bank provisions to non-performing loans.
Source:  EU-10 Regular Economic Report: From Stabilization to Recovery, The World Bank Group, October 2009, based 
on Global Financial Stability Report, International Monetary Fund, October 2009.
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ent banks should continue to support their 
subsidiaries in the EU-10 countries, central 
banks and governments should remain vig-
ilant to liquidity and solvency risks in the 
banking sector, and governments would be 
well advised to help minimize credit de-
faults among the most vulnerable house-
holds with targeted interventions that sup-
port the needy while ensuring that capac-
ity to repay remains always at the fore. In 
addition, financial supervision authorities 
need to learn from the lessons of the previ-
ous banking crises and facilitate orderly re-
structuring of the corporate and household 
debt, including through mechanisms that 
facilitate good faith negotiations between 
the parties to individual loans. Greater col-
laboration between home and host super-
visory banking authorities would also be 
helpful to ensure that the build-up of vul-
nerabilities that preceded this crisis can be 
avoided in future. 
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